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Liquidity Constraints, the Extended Family, and Consumption 
Abstract 
This study examines whether the extended family influences consumption. Extending prior tests 
on food consumption to total consumption, little to no evidence is found in support of altruism 
among related households and or that fluctuations in dynastic income affects one’s own 
consumption. However, the effect of transitory fluctuations in own income on consumption are 
contingent on own wealth and the wealth of the extended family, with estimates of the marginal 
propensity to consume roughly three times higher for individuals whose own and extended 
family wealth is low versus individuals whose own and extended family wealth is high. 
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Empirical studies estimating the marginal propensity to consume out of income have 
focused recently on heterogeneity across consumers. Specifically, consistent with theory 
(Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010), researchers have concluded that consumers facing liquidity 
constraints spend a greater share of their transitory income relative to other consumers (Kaplan, 
Violante, and Weidner, 2014; Zeldes, 1989; Browning and Crossley, 2001; Jappelli and 
Pistaferri, 2014; Johnson, Parker, and Souleles, 2006). These findings have important 
ramifications for public policy because policies that increase (or decrease) family income would 
have a larger effect on the macro economy if consumers facing liquidity constraints were the 
ones who experienced increases in their income. 
A distinct literature has examined the extent to which the economic decisions of extended 
family members are interconnected. In particular, this literature has tested the hypothesis that 
income of extended family members, e.g., parents of grown children, affects the consumption 
decisions of grown children even if parents and adult children live in separate households. 
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (AHK, 1992) is the most influential study of this type, where 
they find that income of extended family members may have a small effect on food consumption. 
We integrate these two literatures by extending models estimating the marginal 
propensity to consume out of income to include the role of the extended family. In particular, we 
estimate a model where consumers’ decisions may be influenced by members of their extended 
family and where some family members, but perhaps not others, have limited wealth. The model 
implies that the marginal propensity to consume out of a consumer’s own income is affected not 
only by whether that consumer (e.g., adult child) has few liquid assets, but by whether their 
extended family (e.g., parent) has few liquid assets. Specifically, the marginal propensity to 
 
 
 
consume should be the highest when both the consumer and their extended family have few 
liquid assets. 
Before we test these predictions, we update and extend the empirical tests conducted by 
AHK. AHK was limited by the fact that in the data set that allowed them to examine dynastic 
models — the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) through 1985 — the only consumption 
category that could be analyzed was food. We take advantage of the fact that the PSID 
subsequently significantly expanded the measurement of consumption, allowing us to study a 
nearly comprehensive measure of consumption. Having more expansive data on consumption is 
important because the effects of (own) income on food consumption are small relative to the 
effects on other components of consumption, and therefore AHK’s conclusions that the income 
of the extended family has limited effects on food consumption may not characterize effects on 
total consumption. 
 
Data 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has been used extensively to study consumption 
expenditures of American families, but almost all of these studies are restricted to expenditure 
data on food and housing, which have been measured in the PSID in nearly every wave since 
1968. The PSID expanded measures of consumption expenditures significantly in 1999, and 
again in 2005.  With the new questions, the PSID captured roughly 70 percent of expenditures 
between 1999 and 2003 (food, housing, utilities, vehicles, transportation, health care, education, 
and child care) and 95 percent of expenditures 2005 through 2011 (the prior list plus clothing and 
apparel, home repairs and maintenance, household furnishings and equipment, recreation and 
entertainment, and trips and vacations). Furthermore, estimates of spending based on the PSID 
 
 
 
align well with the best cross-sectional survey data, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (Li et al., 
2010; Andreski et al., 2014). Our analyses are restricted to data from 1999 through 2011 to take 
advantage of the more expensive consumption data. The full set of items analyzed is described in 
detail by Andreski et al. (2013). We report models for two time periods: 1999-2011 with the 
more limited set of measures, and 2005-2011 with the more expansive measures. 
The PSID has two additional strengths. First, when children of PSID sample members 
leave a PSID household they are followed by the survey. As a result, parents and adult children 
are each themselves interviewed. Second, the PSID contains detailed information on income, 
wealth, and consumption. 
Our baseline sample consists of all PSID heads and wives ages 24 and older who have — 
in the same survey year — at least one non-co-resident relative (specifically, a biological mother, 
father, or child, or a half or full sibling) who is also a head or wife and at least 24 years old. The 
number of such individuals in each year is reported in Table 1. For example, in 2011 there were 
7,612 such individuals, 5,207 were heads and 2,405 were wives. These individuals lived in 6,719 
different PSID households (in PSID language, “family units”), and represented 1,504 distinct 
family dynasties (in PSID language, “distinct 1,968 IDs”). 
Our analysis sample size varies depending on the analytic model estimated because of 
missing values in specific measures and model specifications. For example, we use the log 
transformation for income and consumption, therefore cases with zero values of income (0.8%) 
or consumption (about 1.4 percent) are dropped. The analysis sample that includes more 
complete expenditure measures is limited to the years of 2005-2011. To test life-cycle model, we 
include lagged variables (t-2 and t-4) of nonasset family/dynasty income, which results in 
 
 
 
missing values for those who recently entered PSID or recently qualified under our baseline 
analysis sample criteria.   
We consider two different definitions of dynasty, one including only close relatives — 
i.e., “narrow dynasty” — and one including relatives of any kind – i.e., “broad dynasty.” The 
narrow dynasty includes one’s biological mother, father, child, and full/half siblings who are also 
PSID heads or wives ages 24 and older and do not live in the same PSID family unit as that 
individual. An individual’s dynasty members can change over time as some family members 
become age 24 and older, or a head or wife during the sample period, and because step-siblings 
may change due to divorce or marriage by parents. Moreover, the dynasty structure is not 
necessarily hierarchical; dynasty composition of a focal person may differ from the dynasty 
composition of a fellow dynasty member. Potential sources of such cases include in-law 
relationships, remarriage, grandchildren, and grandparents. For example, suppose a focal person 
has a mother and a biological child in his dynasty. However, the mother of the focal person does 
not include the child (i.e., her grandchild) in her dynasty per our definition of dynasty. Another 
example is the case of husbands and wives; a focal person has his wife and his biological parents 
in his dynasty but does not have parents-in-law, while his wife includes them in her dynasty. 
Therefore, the couple can have different composition of dynasty members while they themselves 
are members of each other’s dynasty. About half of the sample members are not nested within 
the dynasty (i.e., a focal person’s dynasty composition is not the same as the dynasty 
composition of at least one member in the focal person’s dynasty). We also estimated models 
using a broader definition of dynasty where anyone in the same PSID “1968 ID” is defined as 
being members of the same dynasty. Our substantive findings did not change and, therefore, we 
do not report estimates using the broad definition. 
 
 
 
For some empirical models we include dynasty fixed-effects. In these models we restrict 
the sample to individuals within dynasties where all members of a given dynasty share the exact 
same dynasty members, i.e., individuals are fully nested within dynasties. Appendix Table A1 
summarizes frequencies by the number of a person’s dynasty members whose dynasty members 
are not identical to the person’s. 
Dynasty income and wealth is the average among family units that contain members of a 
given dynasty, excluding one’s own family unit income and wealth. For example, if a woman 
lives by herself, her biological parents live together, and her son and daughter are 24 and older 
and live independently, her average dynasty income is the average family unit income among 
three PSID family units: her parents’, her son’s, and her daughter’s.1  
It is not clear whether AHK included the value of food stamps in their measure of food 
consumption. Therefore, we use two consumption measures of food: excluding food stamps and 
including food stamps. The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) was 
applied for the price adjustment for income, wealth, and consumption, expressed in 2011 dollars.  
Descriptive statistics for all variables for each analysis sample are summarized in Table 2. Also 
in Table 2 are descriptive statistics for all individuals 24 and older, regardless of whether they 
are a head or wife or have at least one non-co-resident  biological mother, father, child, or 
full/half sibling who is also a head or wife 24 or older (i.e., our baseline sample). We find that 
the socioeconomic composition is quite similar in the two samples. 
 
  
                                                          
1 AHK include one’s own income and wealth in the calculation of dynasty income and wealth when 
testing the life-cycle model; therefore, we report estimates in appendix table A2 using their approach 
for comparison. 
 
 
 
Testing altruism and life-cycle models 
The altruism model implies that own resources have no effect on own consumption once dynasty 
resources are controlled (AHK, 1992). The life-cycle model, on the other hand, predicts that own 
resources influence own consumption. We test these predictions using AHK’s econometric 
approach but with more expansive consumption and wealth data in recent waves of the PSID. 
Altruism. The econometric model used for the static test of altruism is: 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is log consumption (i.e., food 1999-2011; total 1999-2011; total, expanded 2005-2011) 
by household k of dynasty i , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are demographic control variables (quadratic in the number of 
members in own household and average number of members of households within one’s 
dynasty, own age and age of household head, own gender and the gender of household head, race 
of household head, marital status of household head), 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is log total household income 
excluding private transfers, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the dynasty fixed effect and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term that is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with Y. All years of data are pooled, and we include year indicators as control 
variables. 
The dynamic test is the first difference of (1): 
∆𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽′∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
Standard errors for both models are White standard errors, allowing for clustering at the year-
dynasty level. Because the PSID has surveyed every two years since 1997, the first difference in 
our analysis is the difference between year t and year t-2.  
Households are not stable units over time. For example, when a couple divorces the 
household splits. In such cases, analyzing changes in “households” is problematic. Some studies 
address this challenge by restricting analyses to households that have little or no demographic 
 
 
 
change, for example, households in which there is no marriage or divorce. A limitation of this 
approach is that changes in family structure are important events that should be considered. 
Therefore, we use a different approach. Throughout our analyses, adults (specifically, PSID 
heads and wives) in a given year are the units of analysis. This allows us to follow adults as they 
change households and examine their household consumption. 
To compare our results with AHK’s, we begin by modeling food consumption, but for the 
years of data on which we focus, 1999 – 2011 (Table 3). For the static models, we find that own 
income has a sizable effect, with an elasticity of 0.290 when the dynasty fixed effect is not 
included but we restrict to individuals in nested dynasties, very similar to AHK’s estimate of 
0.286 (Table 3, row 1, in brackets). Not restricting to nested dynasties leads to a very similar 
estimate, 0.303. Adding fixed effects lowers the income effect to 0.240, which is the same as 
AHK (0.240; their Table 3, row 1).  
The dynamic test implies a substantially lower but still statistically significant effect: 
0.075 without dynasty fixed effects and 0.090 with the fixed effects. Our dynamic estimates are 
smaller than AHK’s. 
Including the amount of food stamps as food spending lowers the effect of income. This 
pattern is expected because only low-income households are eligible for food stamps and food 
consumption from food stamps is not as sensitive to income changes. However, the effect of own 
income remains statistically significant and substantial. 
As expected, income has a larger effect on the broader measures of consumption than it 
has on food alone. First consider consumption (excluding food stamps) that is consistently 
measured from 1999-2011. For these categories of spending, the income effect in the dynamic 
fixed effect specification is 0.100 for total consumption versus 0.090 for food consumption only. 
 
 
 
The most inclusive measure of consumption, available 2005-2011, has an income effect of 0.128 
in the dynamic fixed effect model. In sum, regardless of specification, income has a substantial, 
statistically significant effect on consumption, which is inconsistent with altruism. 
Life-cycle model. The static test of the life-cycle model consists of regressing log 
consumption on log household income (excluding private transfers and asset income) for time t 
and lagged two periods, log average dynasty income (excluding private transfers and asset 
income) for time t and lagged two periods, household wealth without home equity at time t, and 
average dynasty wealth without home equity at time t. We use the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation on wealth because a substantial share of families has zero or negative wealth. 
Control variables include a quadratic in the number of members in own household and average 
number of members of households within one’s dynasty, own age and age of household head, 
own gender and the gender of household head, race of household head, marital status of 
household head, and year indicators. The life-cycle model predicts that the dynasty income effect 
is zero. 
Estimates from the static model implies a substantial effect of own income on food 
consumption including food stamps, with a total effect (i.e., the sum of current and two lagged 
effects) equal to 0.239 (Table 4). The estimate of dynasty income is 0.047 and statistically 
significant.2  
The effects of own income and dynasty income are larger for the more expansive 
measures of consumption. When food stamps are included, for food, total consumption (1999–
                                                          
2 Comparisons with AHK are not strictly parallel because they use annual data and lagged income 
measured at t-1 and t-2 instead of t-2 and t-4. Furthermore, AHK includes own income (wealth) in 
dynasty income (wealth). In Table A2 we re-estimate the models reported in table 4 by using AHK’s 
definition of dynasty income and wealth. Compared to AHK’s estimates, our estimates in table A2 are 
somewhat greater. 
 
 
 
2011), and total expanded consumption (2005-2011), the own income effect (dynasty income 
effect) is 0.239 (0.047), 0.462 (0.071), and 0.501 (0.078), respectively. 
Given the substantial difference in estimates when more categories of consumption are 
considered, Table 5 reports estimates for each of the main spending categories. A substantial 
share of families has no spending in some categories in a given year; therefore we estimate three 
different models: log consumption dropping observations without positive spending in a given 
category, log consumption dropping observations that do not have positive spending in all of the 
categories reported in Table 5 (i.e., balanced sample), and a linear probability model of having 
any spending in the given category. For all three approaches, own and dynasty income effects are 
smaller for food consumption than for almost all of the other seven consumption categories. The 
effects are especially large for trips and vacations: 0.656 and 0.167 for own and dynasty 
consumption, respectively. Vacations are particularly interesting because family members often 
experience them together. If one’s parents’ income increases, then the parents may purchase a 
longer or more expensive vacation. If they share vacation with their children, they may also pay 
for some of their adult children’s vacation. Alternatively, in order to satisfy their parents’ desire 
for a more expensive joint vacation, the adult children may also increase vacation expenditures 
even if their own income is unchanged. 
The dynamic test of the life-cycle model consists of estimating the econometric model 
where change in log consumption is the dependent variable and change in log own income and 
change in log average dynasty income are the key explanatory variables. Control factors include 
year indicators and changes in the demographic factors (i.e., quadratic in the number of members 
in own household and average number of members of households within one’s dynasty, own age 
and age of household head, own gender and the gender of household head, race of household 
 
 
 
head, marital status of household head). We estimate models of change over two years and four 
years. For two-year change, we find estimates of own income on food of 0.049 when food 
stamps are included (table 6). As expected, own income effects are larger when consumption on 
additional items is considered: 0.093 for the most comprehensive measure of consumption. The 
estimates based on four-year change are larger than those based on two-year change. For 
example, the estimate for the most comprehensive measure of consumption is 0.136 versus 
0.093. 
The dynamic tests with four-year change imply marginally significant but meaningful 
effects of dynasty income on own food consumption and the more comprehensive measure of 
consumption available 1999 – 2011. For food consumption including food stamps, the dynasty 
effect is 0.011, which is roughly one-seventh the size of the effect of own income, 0.070. The 
more comprehensive measure available for 1999–2011 has a similar dynasty effect — 0.010 — 
and is roughly one-tenth the size of the effect of own income. For the most comprehensive 
measure of consumption, available 2005 – 2011, the dynasty effect is 0.014, also roughly one-
tenth the size of the effect of own income, 0.136. However, with roughly half the sample size, 
this effect is not statistically significant. In sum, we interpret the collection of estimates from the 
static and dynamic models as indicating suggestive evidence of an effect of dynastic income on 
one’s own consumption. 
 
Marginal propensity to consume and dynastic liquidity constraints 
The updated and extended tests of AHK provide little to no support for the strict altruism 
model and fairly strong evidence for the life-cycle model. In this section we extend our 
investigation of the life-cycle model by testing for heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to 
 
 
 
consume out of transitory income. Recent literature has demonstrated that the transitory income 
effect varies by liquid wealth holdings, with much larger effects among households with little or 
no liquid wealth (Kaplan et al., 2014; Zeldes, 1989; Browning and Crossley, 2001; Jappelli and 
Pistaferri, 2014; Johnson, et al. 2006).  
The extended family is thought to be one of the most important sources of credit and 
insurance. Therefore, we test the hypothesis that the magnitude of transitory income effects are 
contingent on own wealth and wealth of the extended family.  
To estimate the transitory income effect on consumption, we use the approach of 
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), Kaplan and Violante (2010), and Kaplan, Violante, and 
Weidner (2014). First, we regress log household income and log consumption (food, total 1999 – 
2011, and total expanded 2005 – 2011) on age (quartic), education (<12, 12, >12), race (white, 
black, others), family unit size (one, two, three, four, five+), marital status of head (married, not 
married), employment status (employed, not employed), region (six categories), year indicators, 
and interactions between the year indicators and education, race, employment, and region. From 
this model, we calculate the residuals of log consumption and log income. We then regress the 
change in the residuals of log consumption on the change in residuals of log income, but 
instrument change in the residuals of log income at time t with residuals of log income at time 
t+2. 
We stratified these models by liquid (i.e., non-housing) wealth and average liquid wealth 
of dynasty members excluding one’s own liquid wealth. We use wealth measured in 1999 to 
determine wealth status. For those who entered the analysis sample after 1999, we use the wealth 
measure that was first observed. Theory provides only limited guidance on exactly how the 
magnitude of the marginal propensity to consume differs across levels of liquid wealth. 
 
 
 
Therefore, our choice of wealth categories is driven largely by available sample size to detect 
differential effects. Separately for own liquid wealth and for extended family average liquid 
wealth, we identify three groups: below the 25th percentile, 25-75th percentile, and greater than 
the 75th percentile. The 25th percentile for own liquid wealth (extended family average liquid 
wealth) is $6 ($2,300). The 75th percentile of own liquid wealth (extended family average liquid 
wealth) is $79,217 ($84,557). Cross-classifying household wealth by extended family wealth 
generates nine categories for which the transitory income effect is estimated. The size of each of 
the nine groups is reported in Table A3. 
There is a strong correlation in wealth holdings of parents and adult children (Charles and 
Hurst, 2003). However, there remains a substantial share of adult children with low wealth 
whose parents have significant wealth holdings. Among households in the bottom quartile of the 
1998-2011 sample, 54 percent are members of dynasties whose wealth is in the middle 50 
percent and 19 percent in the top quartile (Table A3).  
Before estimating models stratified by wealth, we estimate the effect of transitory income 
for the full sample, but separately for the different consumption measures. Transitory income 
effects are much larger for total consumption than for food consumption: 0.089 versus 0.039 
when food stamps are included (Table 7). 
The estimates of the marginal propensity to consume – by own wealth and dynasty 
wealth – are reported in Table 8. The last column in each panel reports estimates by own wealth 
regardless of dynasty wealth. The pattern of estimates is generally consistent with prior findings, 
with substantial and statistically significant effects among the bottom two categories of own 
wealth but no significant effect among individuals in the top quartile of the own wealth 
 
 
 
distribution. For the most part, this pattern holds regardless of the measure of consumption 
analyzed.  
Consistent with the predictions based on theory, among individuals in the bottom own 
wealth category, the estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income 
are qualitatively larger if dynasty wealth is in one of the bottom two groups. For example, in the 
middle panels where consumption measured from 1999 through 2011 is examined, the marginal 
propensity to consume for low-wealth families (bottom 25 percent), whose dynasty wealth is in 
the bottom two categories, ranges from 0.108 to 0.143. In two of the four cases the marginal 
propensity to consume is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, but it is -0.02 and insignificant 
for the highest category of dynasty wealth. This pattern also exists when the broadest measure of 
consumption is examined (i.e. the bottom panels), although the point estimates are not 
statistically significant.  
The estimates of the marginal propensity to consume among individuals in the middle or 
top of the own-wealth distribution are less consistent with predictions. Among individuals in the 
middle of the own-wealth distribution, the estimates of the marginal propensity to consume are 
not larger for individuals whose dynasty wealth is low. In fact, the statistically significant effects 
among the middle-wealth category are among individuals whose dynasty wealth is in the middle 
or top category. 
 
Discussion  
The recent economic downturn has refocused attention on the role of the family in 
providing protection against economic shocks. The media is replete with stories of older parents 
helping adult children cope with unemployment, perhaps to the detriment of their own retirement 
 
 
 
and savings plans. This assistance is not limited to transfers from parents to adult children but 
can also flow from children to parents, a potentially important phenomenon as layoffs in the last 
recession hit older workers particularly hard.  Assistance can take many forms, including cash, 
in-kind gifts, and time help. Furthermore, even if assistance is not received, knowing that the 
extended family is available if needed may affect behavior. 
As the national population ages and programs such as Social Security come under 
increasing financial pressure, understanding the role of families in providing support for their 
members becomes increasingly important. Furthermore, to the extent that support of adult 
children affects the savings and labor market behavior of older workers, older parents may find 
their own futures negatively affected by shocks to the incomes of their children.  And children 
hit hard in their peak earning years may be unable to provide for elderly parents.  
Despite widespread anecdotal evidence of beneficence, empirical tests have rejected 
altruism as a motivation for behavior.  Many of these tests have relied on the relationship 
between changes in incomes of parents and children and changes in family transfers (Cox, 1987, 
Altonji et al., 1997). However, economic models also suggest that individuals save in order to 
smooth consumption and cope with declines in income. A negative shock need not necessitate 
assistance from family if individuals have their own wealth holdings or have access to credit.  
A more rigorous test would be based on changes in consumption. However, because of 
the paucity of consumption data in national surveys, studies examining the role of family in 
smoothing consumption are rare. Altonji et al.’s widely cited study uses data on food 
consumption in the PSID to test whether resources are shared fully within families. They 
examine the effect of own income on consumption controlling for extended-family fixed effects, 
and strongly reject strict altruism and, furthermore, find limited to no evidence that changes in 
 
 
 
dynastic income leads to changes in food consumption 1968-1985. Our estimates using 
comprehensive information on consumption from 1999-2011 imply similar qualitative 
conclusions about altruism; we reject the predictions of the strict altruism model. However, the 
estimates from the static and dynamic models taken together imply suggestive evidence in favor 
of effects of dynastic income on own consumption. 
We go on to test whether the response of own consumption to changes in transitory 
income is dependent on not only one’s own wealth, but the wealth of the extended family. We 
find some evidence indicating that the effect of transitory income on consumption is influenced 
by the level of wealth held by extended family members.   
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Number of 
individuals 
(unit of 
analysis)
Number of 
heads
Number of 
wives
Number of 
PSID family 
units
Number of 
dynasties
Number of 
individuals 
(unit of 
analysis)
Number of 
heads
Number of 
wives
Number of 
PSID family 
units
Number of 
dynasties
1999 5310 3523 1787 4696 1326 11687 6795 3840 6691 2490
2001 5686 3758 1928 5031 1359 12318 7168 4065 7079 2426
2003 6106 4083 2023 5403 1414 13014 7612 4169 7490 2393
2005 6594 4396 2198 5817 1452 13469 7806 4331 7665 2347
2007 6879 4613 2266 6053 1473 13905 8102 4454 7909 2278
2009 7380 4995 2385 6496 1517 14594 8514 4599 8335 2244
2011 7612 5207 2405 6719 1504 14887 8735 4594 8549 2190
Total 45567 30575 14992 40215 10045 93874 54732 30052 53718 16368
Analytic sample: heads and wives 24 and older who have - in the same year - at least one non-coresident  biological mother, father, child, or full/half 
sibling who is also a head or wife 24 or older.
Table 1. Number of individuals, PSID family units, and dynasties
Analytic sample without restricting to nested dynasties (Baseline 
sample) All individuals 24 and older
 
 
 
 
  
  
Nested dynasty 
sample
Baseline analysis 
sample
All individuals 
>=24
Characteristic Statistic N=23314 N=45567 N=93874
Age mean (years) 48.4 47.1 45.3
Female % 54.8 55.6 53.6
Race of head    
White % 68.9 65.8 62.2
Black % 26.5 30.8 30.9
Others % 4.6 3.4 6.9
Marital status of head     
Married or permanently cohabiting % 70.4 64.7 67.1
Single, never legally married % 12.6 15.7 12.7
Widowed % 4.9 5.5 5.7
Divorced % 9.4 10.9 10.2
Separated % 2.7 3.2 4.3
Number of family members q25; q50; q75 2; 2; 4 2; 2; 4 2; 3; 4
Annual family consumption     
Food (without foodstamp) median ($) 6240 5720 6160
Foodstamp  f >0; 
median $ among 7%; 2400 9%; 2532 10%; 2760
Total consumption median ($) 31131 29637 31047
Total consumption/# in FU median ($) 12748 12584 11651
Total consumption 2005-2011 median ($) 41516 38000 40033
Total consumption/# in FU 2005-2011 median ($) 17032 16285 15072
Annual family income     
Family Income without transfer median ($) 56108 51000 52706
Per capita Family Income without transfer median ($) 22950 21683 19733
Family non-asset income median ($) 54600 50000 51600
Annual narrow dynasty income     
N. of families per dynasty q10; q50; q90 2; 4; 7 2; 3; 6  
Average narrow dynasty income 
(per family) median ($) 61323 58180  
Average expansive dynasty non-asset income (per family) median ($) 59147 56067  
Family wealth     
Family wealth without equity median ($) 27000 18000 16000
Per capita Family wealth without equity median ($) 10500 7300 5700
Family wealth with equity median ($) 83000 57800 52000
Per capita Family wealth with equity median ($) 32075 23000 18339
Narrow dynasty wealth     
N. of families per dynasty q10; q50; q90 2; 3; 5 2; 3; 6  
Average narrow dynasty wealth without equity (per family) median ($) 48880 41683  
Average narrow dynasty wealth with equity (per family) median ($) 106734 92225  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
 
 
 
 
 
  
No dynasty fixed 
effect
Sample 
size
No dynasty fixed 
effect
Dynasty fixed 
effect
Sample 
size
No dynasty fixed 
effect
Sample 
size
No dynasty fixed 
effect
Dynasty fixed 
effect
Sample 
size
 
Food 1999-2011, excluding food 
stamps 0.303*** 44085 0.290*** 0.240*** 22677 0.084*** 32813 0.075*** 0.090*** 16349
[0.286 t=33.07] [0.240 t=23.29] 23257 [0.144 t=13.35] [0.137 t=10.43] 15439
Food 1999-2011, including food 
stamps 0.204*** 44481 0.212*** 0.170*** 22826 0.050*** 33254 0.054*** 0.056*** 16501
Total consumption 1999-2011, 
excluding food stamps 0.424*** 44632 0.418*** 0.358*** 22895 0.090*** 33454 0.099*** 0.100*** 16588
Total consumption 1999-2011, 
including food stamps 0.389*** 44611 0.391*** 0.332*** 22883 0.075*** 33419 0.086*** 0.084*** 16570
Total consumption, expanded, 2005-
2011, excluding food stamps 0.459*** 28026 0.461*** 0.405*** 12878 0.112*** 18455 0.126*** 0.128*** 8236
Total consumption, expanded, 2005-
2011, including food stamps 0.424*** 28003 0.433*** 0.378*** 12865 0.098*** 18422 0.113*** 0.110*** 8217
AHK's estimates reported in brackets and are from table 3 in their manuscript. AHK dynamic tests are for two-year difference to parellel our two-year differences. 
*,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level, respectively.
Control variables included in all models: quadratics in the number of members in own household and average number of members of households within one's dynasty, own age and age of household head, own 
gender and the gender of household head, race of household head, marital status of household head, year dummies. 
Baseline sample Restricted to nested dynasty sample Baseline sample Restricted to nested dynasty sample
Table 3. Tests of altruism: Effects of own income on consumption
 
Static test Dynamic test
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Food 1999-
2011, excluding 
food stamps
Food 1999-
2011, including 
food stamps
 
consumption 
1999-2011, 
excluding food 
 
consumption 
1999-2011, 
including food 
 
consumption, 
expanded, 2005-
2011, excluding 
 
consumption, 
expanded, 2005-
2011, including 
N=28509 N=28493 N=28509 N=28493 N=18912 N=18899
Own income
 t  0.197*** 0.122***  0.247***  0.226***  0.267*** 0.247***
 t-2  0.076*** 0.062***  0.129***  0.126***  0.135*** 0.130***
 t-4  0.067*** 0.055***  0.112***  0.109***  0.125*** 0.124***
ihs own wealth time t  0.003*** 0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.003*** 0.003***
Dynasty income       
 t  0.041***  0.031***  0.040***  0.038***   0.053***  0.050***
 t-2 0.007 0.008  0.014*   0.015*  0.007 0.008
 t-4  0.019*  0.008  0.022***  0.018**   0.024**  0.020** 
ihs dynasty wealth time t -0.001 -0.002** -0.001+  -0.001*  -0.001 -0.001+  
Sum of income coefficients     
  Own 0.340*** 0.239*** 0.488*** 0.462*** 0.526*** 0.501***
  Dynasty 0.066*** 0.047*** 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.078***
+, *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level, respectively.
ihs=inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Control variables included in all models: quadratics in the number of members in own household and average number of members of 
households within one's dynasty, own age and age of household head, own gender and the gender of household head, race of household head, 
marital status of household head, year dummies.
Table 4. Static tests of life cycle model: Effects of own and dynasty resources on consumption
 
 
 
 
Food 1999-
2011, including 
food stamps
Utilities, 1999-
2011
Vehicle gas, 1999-
2011
Health care, 1999-
2011
Clothing, 2005-
2011
Household 
repairs, 2005-
2011
Household 
furnishings, 2005-
2011
Trip/vacations, 
2005-2011
Drop observations with no consumption in given category
 N=28493 N=27038 N=25485 N=26559 N=17886 N=11321 N=12054 N=12662
  Sum of income coefficients
    Own 0.239*** 0.169*** 0.272*** 0.440*** 0.577*** 0.536*** 0.478*** 0.656***
    Dynasty 0.047*** -0.030*** -0.044*** 0.124*** 0.097*** 0.061* 0.041+ 0.167***
Drop observations with no consumption in any of the given categories (i.e., balanced panel, 2005-2011)
 N=6342 N=6342 N=6342 N=6342 N=6342 N=6342 N=6342 N=6342
  Sum of income coefficients
    Own 0.278*** 0.219*** 0.254*** 0.292*** 0.637*** 0.575*** 0.516*** 0.667***
    Dynasty 0.037*** 0.003 -0.056** 0.049+ 0.097*** 0.038 0.038 0.178***
Linear probability model of whether any spending (i.e., 0/1)
 na N=28509 N=28509 N=28509 N=18912 N=18912 N=18912 N=18912
  Sum of income coefficients
    Own na 0.046*** 0.087*** 0.079*** 0.043*** 0.156*** 0.103*** 0.190***
    Dynasty na 0.000 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.002 0.018** 0.012+ 0.057***
+, *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level, respectively.
na=Not applicable because all observations have positive food consumption.
Table 5. Static tests of life cycle model: Effects of own and dynasty resources on consumption
Disaggregated consumption
Control variables included in all models: quadratics in the number of members in own household and average number of members of households within one's dynasty, own 
age and age of household head, own gender and the gender of household head, race of household head, marital status of household head, year dummies.
 
 
 
 
  
 
Food 1999-
2011, excluding 
food stamps
Food 1999-
2011, including 
food stamps
 
consumption 
1999-2011, 
excluding food 
 
consumption 
1999-2011, 
including food 
 
consumption, 
expanded, 2005-
2011, excluding 
 
consumption, 
expanded, 2005-
2011, including 
t-(t-2) N=30718 N=30852 N=30948 N=30913 N=17867 N=17837
  Change in own income 0.085*** 0.049*** 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.107*** 0.093***
  Change in dynasty income 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
t-(t-4) N=23611 N=23713 N=23777 N=23758 N=11064 N=11052
  Change in own income 0.120*** 0.070*** 0.129*** 0.112*** 0.155*** 0.136***
  Change in dynasty income 0.013+ 0.011+ 0.011+ 0.010+ 0.014 0.014
+, *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level, respectively.
Control variables included in all models: quadratics in the number of members in own household and average number of
 members of households within one's dynasty, own age and age of household head, own gender and the gender of 
 household head, race of household head, marital status of household head, year dummies.
Table 6. Dynamic tests of the life cycle model: Effects of change in own and dynasty resources on change in consumption
 
 
 
 
 
Food 1999-
2011, excluding 
food stamps
Food 1999-
2011, including 
food stamps
Total 
consumption 
1999-2011, 
excluding food 
stamps
Total 
consumption 
1999-2011, 
including food 
stamps
Total 
consumption, 
expanded, 2005-
2011, excluding 
food stamps
Total 
consumption, 
expanded, 2005-
2011, including 
food stamps
N=21133 N=21109 N=21133 N=21109 N=9767 N=9750
Family Income 0.059** 0.039* 0.100*** 0.089*** 0.093*** 0.089***
*,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level, respectively.
Table 7. Marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income shocks
 
 
 
 
 
1999-2011 
Sample
Bottom 25% 25-75% Top 25% 1999-2011 
Sample
Bottom 25% 25-75% Top 25%
Bottom 25% 0.074 0.159* -0.002 0.099* Bottom 25% 0.019 0.091+ -0.001 0.053
25-75% 0.025 0.054 0.115* 0.063* 25-75% -0.006 0.053+ 0.106* 0.053*
Top 25% -0.084 -0.02 0.007 -0.017 Top 25% -0.065 -0.017 0.008 -0.011
1999-2011 
Sample
Bottom 25% 25-75% Top 25% 1999-2011 
Sample
Bottom 25% 25-75% Top 25%
Bottom 25% 0.108 0.143** -0.02 0.102*** Bottom 25% 0.111+ 0.116** -0.021 0.086**
25-75% 0.082+ 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.133*** 25-75% 0.059 0.140*** 0.153*** 0.122***
Top 25% -0.001 0.062 -0.011 0.022 Top 25% -0.006 0.063 -0.011 0.022
2005-2011 
Sample
Bottom 25% 25-75% Top 25% 2005-2011 
Sample
Bottom 25% 25-75% Top 25%
Bottom 25% 0.111 0.107 -0.009 0.087 Bottom 25% 0.098 0.107+ -0.008 0.082
25-75% 0.021 0.196*** 0.193** 0.152*** 25-75% 0.006 0.184*** 0.190** 0.141***
Top 25% -0.256* 0.180* 0.136+ 0.083 Top 25% -0.246* 0.183* 0.138+ 0.087
+, *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level, respectively.
Effect on total consumption excluding food stamp 
(using 1999-2011 sample)
Effect on total consumption including food stamp 
(using 1999-2011 sample)
Effect on total consumption including food stamp 
(using 2005-2011 sample)
Effect on total consumption excluding food stamp 
(using 2005-2011 sample)
Table 8. Marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income shocks by wealth category
Dynasty wealth (excluding one's own wealth) Dynasty wealth (excluding one's own wealth)
Effect on food expenditure excluding food stamp Effect on food expenditure including food stamp
Own family 
wealth
Own family 
wealth
Dynasty wealth (excluding one's own wealth) Dynasty wealth (excluding one's own wealth)
Own family 
wealth
Own family 
wealth
Dynasty wealth (excluding one's own wealth) Dynasty wealth (excluding one's own wealth)
Own family 
wealth
Own family 
wealth
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
# of person i's dynasty 
members whose dynasty 
members are not identical to i's 
# of 
persons %
# of 
persons %
# of 
persons %
0 3469 65.33 3315 50.27 3294 43.27
1 939 17.68 1782 27.02 2434 31.98
2 524 9.87 610 9.25 639 8.39
3 160 3.01 325 4.93 387 5.08
4 89 1.68 196 2.97 312 4.1
5 55 1.04 156 2.37 222 2.92
6 33 0.62 103 1.56 139 1.83
7 16 0.3 42 0.64 78 1.02
8 15 0.28 35 0.53 48 0.63
9 4 0.08 18 0.27 26 0.34
10 4 0.08 5 0.08 19 0.25
11 2 0.04 3 0.05 8 0.11
12 0 0 1 0.02 5 0.07
13 0 0.01 2 0.03 1 0.01
14 0 0 1 0.02 0 0
Total 5310 100.02 6594 100.01 7612 100
Year 1999 Year 2005 Year 2011
Table A1. Number of individuals in nested dynasties, for selected years
Analytic sample without restricting to individuals in nested dynasties
 
 
 
 
  
Food 1999-
2011, 
excluding food 
stamps
Food 1999-
2011, 
including food 
stamps
Total 
consumption 
1999-2011, 
excluding food 
stamps
Total 
consumption 
1999-2011, 
including food 
stamps
Total 
consumption, 
expanded, 
2005-2011, 
excluding food 
stamps
Total 
consumption, 
expanded, 
2005-2011, 
including food 
stamps
N=29318 N=29302 N=29318 N=29302 N=19247 N=19234
Own income
 t 0.178*** 0.108***  0.224***  0.205***  0.237***  0.218***
 t-2 0.071*** 0.054***  0.119***  0.115***  0.123***  0.117***
 t-4 0.057*** 0.047***  0.098***  0.097***  0.112***  0.112***
ihs own wealth time t 0.003*** 0.002***  0.003***  0.002***  0.004***  0.004***
Dynasty income     
 t  0.068***  0.053***  0.075***  0.072***  0.108***  0.103***
 t-2 0.016  0.022+   0.031**  0.033**  0.026+   0.030*  
 t-4 0.028*  0.017+   0.038***  0.034***  0.029*   0.025+  
ihs dynasty wealth time t 0 -0.001+  -0.001 -0.001+  -0.001 -0.001
Sum of income coefficients     
  Own 0.305*** 0.209*** 0.441*** 0.416*** 0.472*** 0.448***
    AHK estimate [0.208 t=13.97]  
  Dynasty 0.113*** 0.093*** 0.143*** 0.139*** 0.163*** 0.157***
    AHK estimate [0.062 t=3.04]  
AHK estimates  reported in brackets and  based on income measured at t, t-1, and t-2 and reported in their table 6.
+, *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level, respectively.
ihs=inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
Table A2. Static tests of life cycle model: Effects of own and dynasty resources on consumption
INCLUDE own income (wealth) in dynasty income (wealth)
Control variables included in all models: quadratics in the number of members in own household and average number 
of members of households within one's dynasty, own age and age of household head, own gender and the gender of 
household head, race of household head, marital status of household head, year dummies.
 
 
 
 
 
Bottom 25% : 1108 (5.0%) 2150 (9.6%) 746 (3.3%)
25-75%: 2126 (9.5%) 6343 (28.4%) 2621 (11.7%)
Top 25%: 859 (3.8%) 3179 (14.2%) 3227 (14.4%)
 
Bottom 25% : 579 (5.9%) 1028 (10.5%) 374 (3.8%)
25-75%: 1045 (10.6%) 2726 (27.7%) 1168 (11.9%)
Top 25%: 378 (3.8%) 1294 (13.2%) 1240 (12.6%)
Table A3. Sample size (frequency) for sample stratified by own and extended family wealth
Own family 
wealth
1999-2011 Sample
Own family 
wealth
2005-2011 Sample - including more consumption items
Bottom 25%: 25-75%: Top 25%: 
Extended family wealth
Extended family wealth
Bottom 25%: 25-75%: Top 25%: 
